Home > Student Archival Essays > Analyze how the ‘Myth of Collective Security’ was cultivated and evolved in Britain, compared to Australia by the LNU

Analyze how the ‘Myth of Collective Security’ was cultivated and evolved in Britain, compared to Australia by the LNU

by Madison Lucas

'League of Nations - the Hope of the World' Address

Tariff Barriers, Affect on World's Peace Warning to Australia

"For the Prosperity and Peace of the World"

The League of Nations Union was central in the cultivation of the myth of ‘collective security’ which developed in the interwar period.  In the aftermath of the WWI, the creation of the League of Nations was an attempt to ensure peace, through the ideal of collective security. The liberal-internationalist support of collective security characterized the post-war climate, and was backed by populist movements in Britain such as the League of Nations Union (LNU). Such movements existed in other League member states such as Australia.  However, the evolution of the LNU’s attitude towards the protection of collective security in Britain contrasts with Australia, as a result of their different political contexts.  Initially within the UK, the LNU was a peace movement focused on disarmament; however the tumultuous international political climate of the late 1930’s transformed the LNU into a key ‘Churchilllian’ anti-appeasement body.  The Australian branch of the LNU although loyal to promoting collective security, was more focussed on cultivating Australia’s identity on the global stage.  Moreover, the Australian LNU as a result of its geopolitical positioning had a different attitude to appeasement.  In both Australia and Britain the LNU is largely responsible for the perpetuation of the ideal of collective security, regardless if its promised peace was just an interwar myth. 

The LNU was the most popular of the voluntary peace organizations which formed in support of the League of Nations and the interwar internationalist movement. [1]. The League of Nations was formed in the aftermath of the atrocities of WWI the Paris Peace Conference in 1919[2].  The Covenant of the League of Nations outlines that the purpose of the League is to “achieve international peace and security” by promoting joint cooperation of the nations of not just Europe, but the world.[3] The LNU’s Statement on International Policy outlines that the most effective way that the league can “liberate mankind from war” is by the “limitation of national armaments by international agreement.”[4] There is great historical debate over the success of the League, with the eventual outbreak of WWII symbolizing the failure of its initiative of collective security, as its overall goal was to prevent war.  Despite its immediate failure, the League of Nations was successful in inciting populist movements on the home front through initiatives such as the LNU, which were essential in cultivating the myth of collective security.  Susan Pederson asserts that the League itself, as well as the LNU “fed off and promoted popular mobilization.”[5] Thus, the evolution of the LNU illustrates the important role public opinion plays in safeguarding collective security.[6]

The LNU was the main perpetuator of the myth of collective security within the UK.[7]  However, there is much historical contestation as to whether the LNU accurately portrayed the true meaning of collective security to the British people.  Although the term ‘collective security’ wasn’t officially coined till the 1930’s, the political ideology associated with the concept was present from the inception of the League.[8] It is through collective security, the LNU argued, that state sovereignty can be protected whilst ensuring political order and peace.[9]  It is often argued that the LNU were ambiguous in their description of its possible outcomes.  Brin asserts that Lord Cecil, the president of the LNU, presented the policy of collective security as an alternative to war, and did not allude to the possible risks involved.[10] It was however, not that the ideal of collective security changed, but that the evolution of the LNU from a pacifist movement to an anti-appeasement body in the 1930s altered the way the concept was portrayed.[11]

Initially, the LNU upheld the notion of collective security as a peace movement promoting disarmament. In the aftermath of WWI, Hellen McCarthy argues that the LNU was largely responsible for cultivating the pacifist movement in interwar Britain, and mobilized the push for disarmament.[12] However, internal political divisions within the LNU produced an unclear overarching interpretation of what collective security involved. It was this ambiguity which is argued to have prompted the LNU’s demise.[13]  McCarthy asserts that the LNU’s version of collective security was “stunted from birth” as the conflict between Conservatives such as Lord Cecil and pacifists produced problems.[14] McCarthy further outlines how initially the democratization of the LNU as a group without political ties was a positive, it eventually lead to “fuzzy thinking.”[15] Whilst Conservative members of the LNU promoted the League as a “secondary sphere of diplomatic influence,” other believed that it was central to international relations.[16]  Initially within Britain the LNU presented collective security as part of the pacifist movement, but polarization within the party resulted in skewed perspectives of the ideal.  

One of the LNU’s most prominent initiatives illustrating its role as a peace group in support of collective security was the Peace Ballot.  The Peace Ballot of November 1934 prompted a choice between ‘isolated arming’ and ‘collective defence.’[17] Lord Cecil and other contributors to the ballot argued that the results, with the latter emerging victorious, illustrated the “overwhelming approval of the collective system.”[18] Opponents of the LNU however argued that the ballot was politically charged and misleading.[19] Harold Nicholson, a member of parliament at the time, critiqued the LNU’s interpretation of the results, arguing that there is a difference between supporting ‘collective defence’ and being prepared to go to war behind the “banner of the league.”[20] In the aftermath of WWII and the rise of British opposition to appeasement, the Peace Ballot is often blamed for “the failure to confront the dictators.”[21] Violet Bonham Carter in 1941 reflected on the interwar era suggesting that the reluctance of the British to fight off fascism was “entirely due to the peace propaganda and activities of the LNU, and in particular to the Peace Ballot.”[22] The peace ballot was a key tool in cultivating the myth of collective security in interwar England. 

The political environment of the 1930’s prompted a shift within the LNU, as its interpretation of collective security evolved from primarily pacifist, focussing on disarmament, to an anti-appeasement body.  McCarty reveals how as European politics intensified, leaders of the LNU became fearful of being seen as ‘anti-patriotic’ or as appeasers.[23] Thus, the LNU reinvented itself as not just a grass roots peace movement, but an outspoken opponent of appeasement.[24] The results of the Peace Ballot and the pressing threat from Hitler cemented the LNU as “the new war party,” in support of mobilizing in defence of collective security.[25]  Headway, the official publication of the LNU argued in 1933 that with the continued aggression from Japan, “the doctrine of collective security is in jeopardy.”[26] Significantly, the impeding threat of war during the 1930’s deepened the already widening gap between pacifists and those who would re-arm in support of collective security. 

The shift to anti-appeasement within the LNU is often misinterpreted in history to illustrate the un-cohesiveness of its collective security policy.  Brin outlines how the LNU’s stark opposition to the National Governments appeasement policies confused politicians who understood the LNU in the 1920’s as a “bunch of do gooder pacifists.”[27] However, this change in policy does not represent the LNU’s inconsistency, but rather was a reaction to the evolving threats on the global stage.  In the relatively peaceful 1920’s era the conflicting interpretations of collective security within the Union did not have a significant impact. [28] Academics from the University Group on Defence Policy in 1958 theorized that it was unfounded belief within the British Government during the interwar era that it was the pacifist movement, best exemplified by the LNU, which “prevented the adoption of vigorous foreign policy”.[29] They instead argued that the extreme pacifist wing was a minority in the LNU, and that collective security was always the foundation of its policy, and that the movement “always stood for resistance” against fascism.[30] The study highlights the importance in distinguishing between the fractions within the LNU, and how this contributed towards the myth of collective security and its prevention of rearmament.[31]

Despite the evolution of the LNU into an anti-appeasement movement in the 1930’s, there was still great hesitance within the Union to openly support complete rearmament.  Brin asserts that the LNU was a “war party” with a “suspiciously ambivalent attitudes towards armament,” which is expected after such advent support of disarmament in the aftermath of WWI.[32] Lord Cecil recognized that supporting rearmament was essential to collective security, and this shift transformed the LNU into a political body.  Cecil further believed that those who adhered to the pacifist school of thought were not relating the LNU policy to the contemporary international political climate.[33] Brin asserts that the LNU became increasingly more controversial, most notably with its support of Winston Churchill and his ‘Arms and the Covenant’ campaign.[34] Critics of the LNU argued that this alliance limited the credibility of the LNU as it was designed to be a neutral actor.[35]

With the German occupation of the Rhineland, and Mussolini’s aggression in Abyssinia, the ideal of collective security perpetuated by the LNU was proven to be a myth.  Egerton suggests that WWII illustrates that collective security “had failed disastrously,” and consequently so had the LNU as a political lobby group.[36] In defence of the League and the LNU Pederson, reflecting on the interwar period with the benefit of hindsight reveals that it was not the “limitations of collective security” which was unable to prevent war, but “the reluctance of the great powers to give it their full support.”[37] Despite the debate over to what extent the notion of collective security was only a myth, within Britain it was unarguably the foundation of the LNU. 

Similarly, within interwar Australia collective security was essential to the LNU’s cause. However, the Australian LNU had different priorities and was affected by WWI differently to Britain, and accordingly the populist peace movement followed a different trajectory.  The Australian branch of the LNU recognized the significant roll the Union had in influencing policy within Britain.  An exert from the report of the General Secretary of the Australian LNU in 1930 reveals the desire within Australia to initially imitate the movement in Britain, to be “pioneers” for the League, harnessing its political potential.[38] Whilst in Britain there was a shift from a pacifist group to an advent anti-appeasement body, in Australia the LNU was a body more focussed on asserting Australia’s position on a global stage. 

Much alike the LNU abroad, the Australian branch was designed as a support for the League of Nations.[39] The president of the Victorian Branch John Latham argued that only support for the League would bring about world peace.[40]Moreover, similarly to the initial stages of the collective security movement in Britain, critics of the LNU in Australia labelled the group as threateningly pacifist.”[41] This is exemplified by the government attempts to prevent Constance Duncan from representing the LNU on national television in 1938, as it was believed she was “dangerously left wing.”[42] However in the aftermath of WWI, Australia was recognized internationally as a global actor, and the LNU emphasized the importance of creating a strong Australian foreign policy.[43] Raymond Watt, a founding member of the NSW branch of the LNU encompassed this ideal, emphasizing the importance of collective security and internationalism for not just the peace movement, but for securing Australis political identity.[44] Watts argued that the League was a “mechanism to achieve regulation across nations,” and the union was a key tool for achieving this ideal.[45] Thus, the LNU had to address how Australia would participate in international relations as part of the Empire, as well as coming into its own as a member of the League.

Essential to the Australian LNU’s interpretation of collective security was the division over to what extent Australia should be loyal to the British Empire.  In Devetaks analysis of Australia’s role in international relations in the interwar era he argues that a “rift” developed between loyalists to the Empire, and those who “wished to cut or at least loosen the apron strings.”[46] In a pre-war context the British Empire was the only mechanism in which Australia had a voice on a global stage. Now the League of Nations presented Australian politicians with a new forum.  In conjunction with communication developments, this meant Australia’s political needs could be independent of Britain.[47]  Harrison Moore argued in 1933 that this presented a problem for the LNU’s cause, as Australia had to act within the empires compass whilst addressing its personal needs at the League.[48] Summy proposes a different perspective, asserting that as a result of Australia’s allegiance to the empire many politicians saw minimal need for an active role in the League, and accordingly for the LNU.[49] Thus, the different political context of the Australia and its changing role within the empire influenced how the Australian LNU interpreted collective security differently to that within Britain. 

Whilst the LNU in Britain recognized disarmament as imperative to protecting collective security, the LNU within Australia was focussed less on this issue.  The Australian branch recognized disarmament as important, but believed the League served a more essential role in other issues such as human rights causes including the refugee crisis.  Initially, the peace movement in Australia paralleled that in Britain.[50] This is exemplified by the Australian LNU’s response to the increase in defence expenditure, calling for a “definite international policy for mutual reduction” in arms.[51] However, Brown asserts that the pacifist push for disarmament rapidly lost momentum, and that the LNU within Australia took up ‘non-political’ causes, using the notion of collective security in defence of “international justice.”[52] The personal notes of Raymond Watt further reveal that although the LNU initially was characterized by the push for disarmament, it eventually shifted its attention towards championing economic and social causes, particularly through education.[53] This is exemplified by the LNU’s role in assisting Chinese and European refugees through the Refugee Emergency Council of New South Wales in 1938.[54] The political context of the LNU within Australia offered a differing perspective on the importance of disarmament to that in Britain.

Similarly, the geopolitical positioning of Australia influenced the rapid disillusionment within the LNU towards disarmament.  Where in Britain disarmament was always high on the agenda, Australia, far removed from the main fighting arena of WWI did not feel the same pressure from traditional enemies such as Hitler and Mussolini.  Instead, Australia’s positioning in the Asia-Pacific region influenced their approach to collective security, as they were more occupied with the increasing threat of Japan.  It was the failure of the League to react to Japans 1931 invasion of Manchuria which cultivated the Australian notion that collective security as only a myth.[55]  Brin outlines how the LNU in Britain did not perceive the Manchurian crisis to be a significant threat, and supported pacifist tactics.[56] Within Australia however, the threat of Japan was pertinent, as Britain’s danger in the ‘far east,’ was Australia’s ‘near north.’[57]  

Devetak refers to this geopolitical perspective on the Japanese threat in the region as the ‘Australian outlook.’[58] Devetak argues that the rising Japanese militarism in conjunction with “the slow and reluctance emergence of America from isolationism” put significant pressure on the LNU in Australia.[59] Moreover, the absence of the US from the League influenced the Australian LNU’s perspective on collective security.  Geopolitically the US would be a more useful ally for Australia, as the British had a limited role in the southwest pacific.[60]  The Australian publics sentiment to enforce a policy of collective security in the face of the Manchurian crisis is illustrated by the excerpt from a report on the Australian Peace Congress in 1937, in which the government was asked to “take action to support the League” in regards to the dispute.[61]

The myth of ‘collective security’ made up the foundations of the LNU in both Australia and Britain.  However, the interpretations of collective security in the interwar period differ in both countries as a result of different political and geopolitical contexts.  Within Britain the LNU evolved from a pacifist group supporting disarmament to a political movement against appeasement.  Contrastingly, the Australian branch of the LNU had a less linear trajectory, focussing on non-political objectives such as human rights, and diverging over loyalty to the British Empire.  This is a result of Australia mobilizing the ideal of collective security to secure its positon on a global stage, and protecting against the regional threat of Japan.  Despite their differences, the LNU significantly shaped the myth of collective security, laying the foundations for international cooperation in the future. 

References